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Abstract 
This research paper provides a causality assessment on the linkage between 
declines in world trade finance and the world trade collapse in the period 
following the Financial Crisis of 2008 and 2009 as well as the ensuing global 
trade slowdown. The paper performs Granger Causality tests on two time 
series: World trade (volume data acquired from the CPB World Trade 
Monitor) and World trade finance (transaction data acquired from SWIFT), 
using global monthly data from January 2007 to May 2017. In the short run, 
Granger causality always runs one-way from world trade finance to world 
trade. We always find two-way Granger causality for lags longer than two years. 
Importantly Granger causality never runs one-way from world trade to world 
trade finance. Given the short-term nature of trade finance, we conclude that 
world trade finance Granger-causes world trade 
Keywords 
World trade, world trade collapse, world trade slow-down, trade finance, 
Granger causality, financial crisis, SWIFT. 
JEL classification 
F10, F34, F40, F65, G01, G21. 
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Global trade finance, trade collapse and trade 
slowdown: a granger causality analysis 
 
1 Introduction 
The global trade collapse that started in late 2008 (Baldwin, 2009) and the 
global trade slowdown that followed (Hoekman, 2015) is a topic for continued 
research. The concensus view identifies the fall in demand as the major cause 
of the downturn in trade flows is, for example, find that declines in total 
manufacturing demand account for more than 80 percent of the reduction in 
trade flows (see also Ahn et al. (2011), Bems et al. (2010), and van Bergeijk 
(2017)). Another key driver of the global trade collapse is omnipresence of 
international value chains, as illustrated by the increases of both the share of 
intermediate goods in world trade and the elasticity of world trade to GPP1 
have remarkably increased over the last few decades (see Freund (2009), 
Cheung and Guichard (2009), van Bergeijk (2013a), van Marrewijk (2009)). 
Besides, protectionism is often seen as an important main reason for trade 
destruction in the period after the trough of the world trade collapse in the 
Great Depression (Eichengreen & Irwin, 2010; Kindleberger, 1978). In 
addition, it is notably that movements to strengthen the openness of trade 
globally have stagnated especially in recent times which to some suggests a new 
wave of protectionism and deglobalization (van Bergeijk & Moons, 2018). 
An important issue in the debate on the world trade collapse and the 
ensuing world trade slow-down is the role of trade finance which some authors 
are arguing that “a lack of trade finance has been one of the reasons for the 
decline in trade” (Auboin & DiCaprio, 2017, p. 11) while other authors argue 
the opposite, namely that the reduction of world trade led to lower demand for 
trade finance Clark (2014, p. 56) states that “changes in trade flows are the 
most important driver of changes in trade finance.”  
 The resolution of this causality debate unfortunately is in an empirical 
sense substantially hindered by the fact that no time series exists for world 
trade finance. In 2004 the Bank of International Settlement (BIS) discontinued 
its trade finance series (co-produced with IMF, OECD and World Bank), 
because “the cost-to-quality ratio of these statistics led the agencies to 
discontinue this effort” (Auboin, 2009b, p. 11). As a consequence no data were 
available for private sector trade finance when world trade collapsed and, 
unfortuntely, the production of a time series still still has not started.2 In this 
paper we therefore use an indirect measure of trade finance activity, namely the 
                                                 
1 GPP is Gross Planet Product, see van Bergeijk 2013. 
2 The only remaining source for time series after 2004 was the Berne Union data base 
which only covers a specific part of the industry, namely (public) trade credit 
insurance. 
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amount of messages that are exchanged via the network of the Society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). This network is 
the global standard in the private sector’s trade finance exchange. It “capture[s] 
a large range of administrative or technical messages related to the processing 
of L/Cs [Letters of Credit] and documentary collections” (Clark, 2014, p. 32).3 
Our use of SWIFT data lines up with Clark’s limiting definition of trade 
financeas “bank products that are specifically linked to underlying international 
trade transactions (exports or imports)” (Clark, 2014, p. 3). In other words, 
trade finance refers to bank-intermediated financial instruments for 
international trade.4 The SWIFT data have been used before in research on the 
world trade collapse (e.g. Chauffour et al. (2010) and van Bergeijk (2010)). The 
SWIFT data indeed is a relevant indicator of trade finance activity as banks in 
different jurisdictions need to communicate with each other about the 
conditions and financial arrangements related to letters of credit, documents, 
payments, etc. Obviously this is not a perfect measure, but given the data 
paucity regarding actual trade finance transactions at the global level the use of 
an indirect observtion is necessary.5 
Figure 1 illustrates the co-movement in world trade finance and world 
trade since the Financial Crisis of 2008 and 2009. Therefore many authors have 
argued that a lack of world trade finance is one of the plausible explanations 
for world trade collapse. 
The major contribution of this paper is the time series analysis of the 
question whether trade finance Granger-causes reductions in world trade 
growth or that the relationship is the other way round. A linear Granger 
causality analysis is a well-established test for the direction of bivariate 
causality. This issue has so far not been investigated in the literature. Analyzing 
the causality relationship between world trade finance and world trade over the 
period from January 2007 to April 2017, we find a two-way Granger causality 
relation between world trade finance and world trade over a two year period 
                                                 
3 Letters of Credit and documentary collection are the main vehicles of trade finance. 
4As such, trade finance is important for both exporters and importers to secure their 
transactions. However, considering long-term business relationships in which the 
business partners have gained great knowledge about each other, trade finance 
becomes costly and less preferred. In such cases, exporters and importers tend to 
provide trade credit to their partners as a way to strengthen their trading relationship, 
improve their competitiveness and reduce transaction costs (IMF/BAFT, 2009). So, 
trade credit, an alternative to trade finance, is an inter-firm financing of trade with 
almost no bank intermediation. Data on intra-firm and inter-firm credit are even more 
difficult to obtain. Therefore, we restrict ourselves to the causality relationship 
between trade finance and trade collapse in late 2008 also because we want to 
investigate the importance of the international banking system in the context of the 
collapse and recovery in global trade. 
5 An additional argument for the validity of use of the SWIFT data is the ‘natural 
experiment’ provided by the EU and US sanctions against Iran that banned from the 
use SWIFT and had a significant impact on trade (van Bergeijk 2015). 
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across different levels of lagged values. Granger causality never runs one-way 
from world trade to world trade finance. Given the short-term nature of trade 
finance, we conclude that world trade finance Granger-causes world trade. 
Figure 1 
Trade finance and trade (Year-on-Year rates of growth, 2008 – 2012) 
-30%
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             Source: SWIFT (World trade finance) and CPB World Trade Monitor (World trade) 
 
The remainder of this working paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
gives an overview of the debate on trade finance and the development of 
world trade since the Great Recession illustrating the inconclusiveness of the 
debate regarding the importance of trade finance as a (potential) driver of 
world trade developments. Section 3 discusses our data series on trade finance 
and and their properties. Next Section 4 introduces Granger Causality tests and 
our research strategy. Section 5 reports and discussed the empirical findings. 
The final section concludes and offers suggestions for further research. 
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2   Literature review 
Many studies on the trade collapse argue that the fall in demand is largely 
responsible for the decline in international trade flows. Using a global input-
output framework for trading data of the US and EU countries, Bems et al. 
(2010, p. 1) conclude that “demand alone can account for 70 percent of the 
trade collapse.” Ahn et al. (2011) simulate a relatively high GDP – trade 
elasticity and find that standard economic models, which do not take into 
account financial shocks, explain about 70 to 80 percent of the trade collapse 
in 2008 and 2009. This result is supported by Eaton et al. (2016) who utilize a 
multilateral general equilibrium model to analyze the world trade data and 
argue that manufacturing demand shocks are responsible for more than 80 
percent of  the decline in trade. Therefore, the concensus is that a major share 
of the world trade collapse is explained by demand conditions, but also that 
this explanation is not complete so that other factors also need consideration. 
Table 1 reports recent studies on the determinants of the world trade collapse. 
Table 1 illustrates not only the interest in the topic of the trade collapse, 
but also the hetrogeneity of the country samples,  data frequencies, the levels 
of aggregation of the data (firm/industry/maco) and research design 
characteristics (such as single versus multi-country analyses and  included 
variables). Some authors work with a theoretical framework or research design 
that does not allow for considering financial constraints (the input-output 
analyses are an example). Other authors by necessity are unable to consider 
trade finance and trade credit because the relevant data are not available for 
their research period (van Bergeijk 2017 who investigates both the Great 
Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession of the 2000s is an example).  
Possibly due to these heterogeneities, the literature is not conclusive. On 
the one hand, authors argue that trade finance is an important driver of the 
world trade collapse. Using firms data, Amiti and Weinstein (2011) find that 
trade finance is responsible for about 20 percent of declines in Japanese 
exports during the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. In France, considering 
dependency on external finance as a proxy for trade finance, Bricongne et al. 
(2012) find that sectors, that were more dependent on external finance, had 
been most intensely hit by the crisis. In addition, the authors observe exports 
in these sectors had dropped more significantly than other sectors with less 
dependency on external finance. Also using external finance as a proxy, 
Manova (2012) argues that the cost of external finance could prevent export-
qualified firms in the US from engaging in exporting. On the other hand, 
authors report insignificant or inconclusive effects of trade finance on the 
2008/9 trade collapse, starting with the seminal study by Levchenko et al. 
(2010) who measure trade finance by a proxy for dependence on financing of 
firms in the US. They report that financial factors play no role in the 2008 – 
2009 trade collapse. Behrens et al. (2013) analyze micro (firm-level) data from 
Belgium finding that credit availability has no effect on exports while 
 
10 
 
Table 1 Studies on drivers of world trade collapse 
Author Year Methodology Data level Period Major cause identified Impact of financial factor 
Clark 2014 
Generalized Method of 
Moments 
National data (Australia, 
Brazil, France, Germany, 
Hong Kong, India, Italy, 
Korea, Spain, UK, and USA) 
1999 to 2012 
Reduce in global demand for capital 
goods and consumer durables 
Trade finance disruptions 
Account for up to one-fifth of 
trade volumes fall, only in the aftermath of the 
Lehman bankruptcy 
Bems et al. 2010 Input-output 55 countries 2008-Q1 to 2009-Q1 Demand shock  
Ahn et al. 2011 
Exports-imports model with 
crisis dummy 
57 countries (expor-ting to 
US), 71 coun-tries (import 
from US) 
January 2007 to July 
2010 
Demand shock 
 
Liquidity contractions 
Prices of goods shipped by sea, which tend to be 
affected by trade finance contractions, rose 
disproportionately 
Eaton et al. 2016 
Combination of input-output 
and gravity model 
23 countries 2006-Q1 to 2009-Q4 Manufacturing demand shock  
Behrens et al. 2013 Difference-in-differences Belgian firms 
First semes-ter of 2007, 
2008, 2009 
Demand shock  
Del Prete and 
Federico 
2014 OLS with firm-time fixed effects 
Italian matched bank-
manufac- turing firms 
2006 to 2010 Constraints of supply of credit 
Significant role in the trade collapse 
 
Paravisini et al. 2014 TLST with IV Peruvian exporting firms July 2007 to June 2009 Credit shortages 
Negative shocks to credit only reduce exports of 
firms maintaining same products or markets 
Levchenko et 
al. 
2010 Multiple linear regression 
U.S. disaggregated sectoral 
imports and exports 
2008-Q2 to 2009-Q2 
Vertical linkages 
Compositional effectsa 
 
Asmundson et 
al. 
2011 
Descriptive studies of 
IMF/BAFT-IFSA Trade 
Finance Surveys 
93 banks in 53 countries 
Surveys in March 2009, 
July 2009, March 2010 
Shocks to trade finance 
Not the major force in hindering the decline in global 
trade 
Korinek et al. 2010 
Descriptive studies of 
IMF/BAFT-IFSA Trade 
Finance Surveys 
44 banks in 23 countries 
Surveys in March 2009, 
July 2009 
Demand shock 
 
Drops in short-term trade finance 
Significant impact, but not as much as the impact of 
fall in demand 
Chor and 
Manova 
2012 Difference-in-differences 
US imports (disaggregated by 
partner country and sector) 
Nov. 2006 to Oct.2009 Trade credit contraction 
Important in transmitting the effects of financial 
crisis to international trade flows 
Amiti and 
Weinstein 
2011 Matching banks with firms Japanese exporting firms Financial crises 1990sb Trade finance 
Account for about 1/3 of Japanese exports fall in the 
1990s financial crises 
Bricongne et al. 2012 
Matching exporters with firm-
level 
credit constraints 
French firms 
January 2000 to April 
2009 
Shocks in demand 
 
Credit constraints 
Limited impact 
Manova 2012 
Heterogeneous-firm model with 
countries at different levels of 
financial development and 
sectoral vulnerability 
107 countries 1985 to 1995 
Financial frictions through three 
channels: selection into domestic 
production, selection into exporting 
and firm-level exports 
Sizeable real effects 
Auboin and 
DiCaprio 
2017 
Analyzing ADB trade finance 
gap survey data 
ADB survey (791 firms from 
96 countries) 
ADB trade finance gap 
survey 2014 
Trade finance gaps 
Small and Medium Enterprises in developing 
countries face lasting challenges in global trade 
Van Bergeijk 2017 
OLS, panel with fixed period 
effects 
173 countries 1930s and 2000s Demand shock  
Notes:  
a “Sectors that are used intensively as intermediate inputs, and those with greater reductions n domestic output, experienced significantly greater reductions in trade.” (Levchenko et al., 2010, p. 2).               
b Assumption: there are similarities between the 1990s and 2008 crises.
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having only a marginal negative effect on imports.6 Matching Italian export 
firms with banks, Del Prete and Federico (2014) find that during the crisis, 
shocks to bank funding activities damaged exports, but according to their 
findings this was due to reduced access to long-term loans rather than 
constrained trade finance. Regarding the linkages between credit supply shocks 
and exports in Peru, Paravisini et al. (2014) report that credit supply shocks 
have negative effects on exports mainly because of the constraints on access to 
working capital ad not due to a lack of trade finance.  
In the early phase of the world trade collapse international organizations 
organized a series of bank surveys into trade finance market conditions (Clark, 
2014). The widely cited April 2009 Trade Finance Survey of the International 
Monetary Fund and the Banking Association For Trade (2009) reported a 
meaningdul decrease in the value of letters of credit only. It pointed out  little 
change in other trade finance product lines (including Export Credit Insurance 
and Short-term Export Working Capital). van Bergeijk (2010) notes that 73% 
of the responding banks reports declining trade activities as the major reason 
for declining trade finance, but that this Survey is frequently cited for the 
finding that the trade finance was the number two cause for the trade collapse 
(57% of the respondents). Indeed, it was observed that the majority view was 
that “lower credit availability contributed to declining trade earlier in the crisis, 
but this share fell in later surveys” (Mora & Powers, 2009, p. 121). Utilizing 
data from these surveys, Asmundson et al. (2011) argue that shocks to trade 
finance did play a role in reductions in international trade although they were 
not the major driver in trade collapse. At the macro level, Korinek et al. (2010) 
find that a decline in short-term trade finance played a significant role in the 
fall in trade.7 
                                                 
6 Note that this is a finding for credit in general of which trade finance is only a 
component. 
7 This argument is supported by Chor and Manova (2012) when analysing data from 
US trading partners. 
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3   Data 
Although many authors thus consider trade finance to be vital and necessary 
for international trade, international statistical organizations and systems have, 
unfortunately, discontinued the time series keeping track of trade finance 
developments. Up until 2004, the IMF, World Bank, BIS and OECD had put a 
combined effort on a statistical series of trade finance, however, “the cost-to-
quality ratio of these statistics led the agencies to discontinue this effort” 
(Auboin, 2009a, p. 4). The remaining sources for trade finance statistics data 
include the Berne Union data (public sector insured trade credit), survey-based 
data, national data, the ICC trade register data, and the SWIFT data. Survey-
based data provides valuable information for banks activities but has 
limitations in covering the very large amount of international trade transactions 
and their supportive instruments since such information is viewed as “sensitive 
data”. Next, national data is considered as not suitable for research that as in 
this paper considers global developments (national data is not available for a 
considerable number of countries around the world). The ICC trade register 
data covers a number of banks that are considered as world leaders in the trade 
finance market and includes even unpublished information on the flows of 
trade finance, which provides very useful insights into trade finance. However, 
this database only covers 21 banks (Clark, 2014). 
This paper adrdesses these problems utilizing the monthly publications 
from SWIFT that report the number of trade finance messages worldwide8. Its 
monthly frequency, global scale, and public availability of data make this data 
the most suitable source for trade finance data in this paper. Unlike data on 
trade finance, data on world trade is quite comprehensive and easy to access. 
We obtain data from the CPB World Trade Monitor (accessed on 20 June 2017; 
see Ebregt (2016) for a description of the monitor). CPB provides monthly 
global trade volumes with consistent quality. Data on trade and trade finance 
was collected monthly from January 2007 to April 2017. The descriptive 
statistics are shown in Table 2. Besides, the stationarity test results are 
presented in Table 3. The first differences of World trade finance and World trade 
are introduced since the stationarity tests show that World trade finance and 
World trade are non-stationary. 
                                                 
8 Monthly amount of FIN messages is collected from the SWIFT IN FIGURES 
publications retrieved from https://www.swift.com/about-us/swift-fin-traffic-
figures/monthly-figures?tl=en#topic-tabs-menu. Data in 2013 was missing due to 
time gaps in data collection. So, we utilized the growth rates and Year-to-date FIN 
figures in 2014 to calculate monthly data in 2013 (see Appendix 2). 
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Table 2 
Descriptivestatistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
World trade finance 124 4001 89 250 630 
Δ(World trade finance) 123 2.2 31 -96.6 97.6 
World trade 124 105 8.3 83.7 120.6 
Δ(World trade) 123 0.16 1.48 -6.0 3.3 
Notes:  
World trade finance: Numbers of trade finance messages, data from SWIFT (see Appendix 1). 
World trade: Merchandise world trade volumes, seasonally adjusted, fixed base 2010=100, data from 
CPB World    Trade Monitor (see Appendix 1). 
Δ(World trade finance): The first differences of World trade finance. 
Δ(World trade finance): The first differences of World trade. 
Table 3 
Stationarity tests 
 World trade finance Δ(World trade finance) World trade Δ(World trade) 
ADF 0.718b -6.740a -0.989b -3.703a 
KPSS 1.290a 0.007b 0.720a 0.087b 
Notes:  
ADF: The Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests, lags (5). 
KPSS: The Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin stationary tests. 
 a The null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level. 
 b The null hypothesis is not rejected at the 1% level. 
As shown in Table 3, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test results 
for the World trade finance and the World trade series suggest that the null 
hypothesis of such tests are not rejected at the 1% level of significance, which 
means that both the time series have unit roots. In addition, the results of the 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin stationary tests of these two series confirm 
that the World trade finance and the World trade series are not stationary since 
the null hypothesis of the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test, that the 
data is stationary, is rejected at the 1% level of significance. Therefore, in order 
to conduct any further time-series analyses, we use the first differences of 
World trade finance and the World trade. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root 
test and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin stationary test results verify that 
the first differences series are stationary, so they qualify for conducting the 
Granger Non-Causality tests in the next section. 
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4   Granger non-causality test and research strategy 
In order to investigate the causality between world  trade finance and world 
trade, we conduct Granger causality tests for the first differences of World 
trade finance and World trade. Since the literature on the direction of causality 
is contradictory and inconclusive we run the Granger causality tests in both 
directions.  
As originally specified in Granger (1969), considering a bi-variate model, a 
stationary time-series Let ( , )P X U  be the probability distribution of Xt when 
using all the information in the universe accumulated since time t–1, while 
( , )P X U Y  be the probability distribution of Xt when using all the 
information other than the past values of Yt, then we conclude that Y Granger 
causes X if ( , ) ( , )P X U P X U Y  . This well-known test consists of a linear 
vector autoregression estimation: 
1 1
1 1
                  (1)
                   (2)
m m
t j t j j t j t
j j
m m
t j t j j t j t
j j
X a X b Y
Y c X d Y


 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
where ,t t   are assumed to be uncorrelated have a mean of zero and 
constant variance. We conclude that Y Granger causes X if 
( , ) ( , )P X U P X U Y  . This requires that some bj statistically differs from 
zero and X Granger causes Y if ( , ) ( , )P Y U P Y U X  so some cj must be 
statistically different from zero. 
We conduct the Granger non-causality tests for two periods. We will start 
with the period January 2007 to May 2017 (the most recent month for which 
data presently are available) that comprises both the pre-world trade collapse 
observations (strong growth of world trade), observations during the world 
trade collapse (sharp decline) and the world trade recovery (sharp increase) and 
observations during the ensuing world trade slow down (low growth of world 
trade). This period provides a comprehensive picture as it covers all phases of 
world trade development and can thus serve as a benchmark when we zoom in 
on the period sub-sample January 2007 to December 2012 (the latter is the 
date at which the start of the trade slowdown is commonly indicated). For 
both the long and the short research period we run the test using different 
number of lags (from 1 to 24 months) in order to investigate the causality in 
short to medium term and to get an indication of consistency of the estimated 
results. 
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5  Empirical findings 
Table 4 reports the Granger causality test results for world trade finance and 
world trade over the period January 2007 to May 2017. The null hypothesis 
“world trade finance does not Granger cause world trade” is rejected while the 
null hypothesis “world trade does not Granger cause world trade finance” is 
not rejected at the usual significance level (1%, 5%) in the first 10 levels of lags. 
Therefore, it appears that in short and medium-run, the Granger causality runs  
Table 4 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests (January 2007 to April 2017) 
Number of lags X=Trade finance 
Y=Trade 
X=Trade  
Y=Trade finance 
Obs. 
 1 7.472*** 0.127 122 
 2 18.197*** 3.918 121 
 3 14.065*** 4.026 120 
 4 14.007*** 5.840 119 
 5 20.622*** 8.087 118 
 6 19.770*** 9.520 117 
 7 20.595*** 9.717 116 
 8 21.795*** 12.284 115 
 9 21.910*** 13.218 114 
10 20.743** 15.569 113 
11 20.722** 24.009** 112 
12 22.834** 23.730** 111 
13 24.027** 22.081* 110 
14 24.881** 34.792*** 109 
15 31.108*** 40.359*** 108 
16 26.345** 47.440*** 107 
17 28.798** 47.965*** 106 
18 31.794** 52.317*** 105 
19 50.154*** 58.775*** 104 
20 50.180*** 56.909*** 103 
21 50.100*** 62.644*** 102 
22 85.333*** 65.136*** 101 
23 66.304*** 59.811*** 100 
24 95.128*** 51.023*** 99 
   Notes: 
   The null hypothesis is X does not Granger cause Y. 
   Trade finance: represented by the first differences of World trade finance. 
   Trade: represented by the first differences of World trade. 
     *       The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level. 
   **     The null hypothesis is rejected at the 2% level. 
    ***   The null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level. 
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one-way from world trade finance to world trade. However, when we 
investigate more than 10 lags in the vector autoregression estimations, a 
feedback relation from world trade to world trade finance appears to be 
significant and its significance becomes consistently stronger and after the 14 
lags becomes as significant as the opposite causailty. Thus over a two year 
period we find a two-way Granger causality relation between world trade 
finance and world trade and the significance of such linkages is consistent 
across different levels of lagged values. 
Table 5 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests (2007 to 2012) 
Number of lags 
X=Trade finance 
Y=Trade 
X=Trade 
Y=Trade finance 
Obs. 
1 6.094** 0.573 71 
2 12.137*** 5.772* 70 
3 10.492** 6.585* 69 
4 12.389** 11.137** 68 
5 19.330*** 11.486** 67 
6 18.918*** 12.624** 66 
7 23.123*** 15.498** 65 
8 24.690*** 17.297** 64 
9 25.397*** 22.781*** 63 
10 25.313*** 23.777*** 62 
11 28.378*** 41.114*** 61 
12 36.736*** 37.206*** 60 
13 41.211*** 41.132*** 59 
14 47.645*** 44.468*** 58 
15 50.032*** 54.719*** 57 
16 48.000*** 67.557*** 56 
17 55.598*** 79.877*** 55 
18 72.744*** 111.140*** 54 
19 78.699*** 118.230*** 53 
20 77.657*** 126.590*** 52 
21 138.880*** 301.140*** 51 
22 231.680*** 330.410*** 50 
23 141.030*** 1675.500*** 49 
     Notes:  
     The null hypothesis is X does not Granger cause Y. 
    Trade finance: represented by the first differences of World trade finance. 
    Trade: represented by the first differences of World trade. 
    *       The null hypothesis is rejected at the 10% level. 
    **     The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level. 
    ***   The null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level. 
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Next we zoom in on the shorter period 2007 to 2012 (Table 5). Starting 
with one lag only the conclusion would be that the Granger causality runs one-
way from world trade finance to world trade, but this conclusion crucially 
depends on the fact that we use a one month only lag. The null hypotheses of 
As shown in Table 5, when the number of lags increases the significance 
of a two-way Granger causality is improved greatly. For any level of lags longer 
than 8, this two-way Granger causality is significant at the 1% level. Hence, 
within 5 years from the trade collapse (2007 to 2012), world trade finance and 
world trade are strongly causally related in both ways. 
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6  Conclusions, discussion and issues for further research 
We can summarize our findings as follows. The relationship is always positive: 
on average world trade and world trade finance move in the same direction. In 
the short run (one month), Granger causality always runs one-way from world 
trade finance to world trade. We do, however, always find two-way Granger 
causality for lags longer than one year. Importantly, Granger causality never 
runs one-way from world trade to world trade finance. The implication is that 
for our research period and at the global level it is less likely that demand 
factors caused the reduction (and later restoration) of world trade. Given the 
short term nature of trade finance (typically three monts) our verdict is that 
world trade finance Granger causes world trade.  
The two-way causality results are unexpected and, since they occur in a 
year,  this provides an interesting and relevant research puzzle. In combination 
with the literature reviewed in Section 2 this suggests that hetrogeneity may be 
hidden under the aggregate finding for trade and finance. Further research 
should be therefore be aimed at the level of individual countries for which 
better and more direct measures of trade finance are available. Another 
relevant extension of our research would be to increase the period under 
investigation: both by including more recent obervations and by adding 
monthly data before 2007. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Data sources 
Variable Definition Data source Date of access 
World trade Merchandise world trade,  
fixed base 2010=100 
CPB World Trade Monitor 20 June 2017 
World trade 
finance 
Monthly total FIN Messages Swift in Figures  
(publications from SWIFT) 
Monthly 
 
Appendix 2 
Calculating world trade finance data in 2013 
 
2014 YTD Growth 2013 YTD 2013 monthly 
 
(A) (B) 
  
Formula 
  
(A)/(1+(B)/100) 
 
Jan 450,026,071 8.8 413,626,903 413,626,903 
Feb 871,035,798 9.6 794,740,692 381,113,788 
Mar 1,339,794,670 10.8 1,209,200,966 414,460,274 
Apr 1,802,965,791 10 1,639,059,810 429,858,844 
May 2,270,070,907 9.2 2,078,819,512 439,759,702 
Jun 2,738,709,458 9.7 2,496,544,629 417,725,117 
Jul 3,219,355,692 9.7 2,934,690,695 438,146,066 
Aug 3,657,363,159 9.4 3,343,110,749 408,420,054 
Sep 4,140,584,423 10.2 3,757,336,137 414,225,388 
Oct 4,656,655,022 10.4 4,217,984,621 460,648,484 
Nov 5,115,456,730 10.2 4,641,975,254 423,990,633 
Dec 5,612,723,850 10.8 5,065,635,244 423,659,990 
  
